Glen Weyl

I am a Senior Researcher at Microsoft Research New York City, where I do research in economics, law and related fields, including computer science. I am visiting Yale University's economics department and Law School as a Senior Research Scholar. I am also co-founder with Eric Posner and Kevin Slavin of Collective Decision Engines, a start-up that commercializes a voting technique I proposed called Quadratic Voting for survey research. I am working on a book for the Princeton University Press with Posner, Radical Markets, that offers a comprehensive set of policy solutions to the present crisis of the liberal order.


Research statement

Google Scholar profile

SSRN profile

Explanation of the Audio and Audio-Visual Formats

Book Project

Radical Markets with Eric Posner, under contract with the Princeton University Press.  Manuscript due Fall 2017, publication expected Spring 2018.

A comprehensive policy agenda to radically expand the scope of markets by challenging private property, one person one vote and borders that aims address the present crisis of the liberal order.

Price Theory and its Mathematical Foundations

Julie Mehretu, Stadia II (2004)

Julie Mehretu, Stadia II (2004)

“Lottery equilibrium” with Josh Mollner, in preparation.  Email me for early notes.

In a continuum economy allowing each individual to engage in a single wager over two wealth levels allows any ex-ante Pareto efficient allocation to be implemented, in contrast to all existing mechanisms.

“Ownership of the Means of Production” with Anthony Lee Zhang, submitted January 2017. (SSRN)

Self-assessed asset taxes at 2.5% are robustly near optimal to combat the monopoly distortion from private property without excessively deterring investment.

“The Average-Marginal Relationship and Tractable Equilibrium Forms” with Michal Fabinger, submitted October 2016. (SSRN)

A formal definition of a hierarchy of levels of tractability for equilibrium models that can be summarized by a single equation and a characterization of all tractable systems at each level.

“Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets” with Neale Mahoney, forthcoming in the Review of Economics and Statistics as of July 2016. (SSRN)

Risk adjustment can be harmful in the presence of imperfect competition and competition policy harmful in the presence of advantageous selection.

“Product Design in Selection Markets” with André Veiga,  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2016, 131(2): 1007-1056. (published version) (SSRN) (op-ed) (mention in Sloan fellowship announcement)

Spence meets Rotschild-Stiglitz: a simple model of firm incentives to sort consumers through product design.

“An Efficient Competitive Economy with Public Good” with Aanund Hylland and Richard Zeckhauser, under preparation and solicited by the Quarterly Journal of Economics.  Email me for early notes. (old version)

Quadratic pricing of influence on collective decisions is the correct analog of linear pricing of private goods.


“Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principle of Incidence under Imperfect Competition” with Michal Fabinger, Journal of Political Economy, 2013, 121(3): 528-583. (published version) (SSRN)

We extend basic principles of incidence from perfet competition to general models of imperfect competition, showing how they unify the analysis of many applications in public finance, industrial organization and international trade.

“Walrasian Equilibrium in Large, Quasilinear Markets” with Eduardo Azevedo and Alexander White, Theoretical Economics, 2013, 8(2): 281-290. (published version)

Equilibrium exists in large, quasi-linear utility economies even when consumers view goods as complements.

“Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay” with Jean Tirole, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2012, 127(4): 1971-2003. (published version) (SSRN) (online appendix) (simulation code) (media coverage) (blog coverage)

A multi-dimensional screening framework for trading off the sorting benefits of IP against its distorting effects on consumption ex-post.

“Linear Demand Systems are Inconsistent with Discrete Choice” with Sonia Jaffe, B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances), 2010, 10(1): article 52. (published version) (SSRN)

We give a simple proof that the linear demand system has no discrete choice representation.

Industrial Organization

“Insulated Platform Competition” with Alex White, submitted January 2017. (SSRN)(presentation video)

Incorporating in static models dynamic pricing strategies to coordinate users simplifies the analysis of platform competition, allowing us to calibrate realistic models of competition.

“Multidimensional Platform Design” with André Veiga and Alexander White, forthcoming in the American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 2017, 107(3).  (SSRN)

A characterization of optimal design and development of platforms when type and not just number of users matter using Bonacich centrality.

“Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase” with Juan Camilo Castillo, December 2016. (SSRN) (Marginal Revolution)

Dynamic pricing helps avoid a bad equilibrium in ride-hailing that would devastate system capacity.

“Let the Right ‘One’ Win: Policy Lessons from the New Economics of Platforms” with Alexander White, Competition Policy International, 2014, 12(2): 29-51. (published version) (SSRN) (Slate coverage)

Existing literature in platform economics suggests there is usually too much fragmentation not too much consolidation in platform industries.

“Competition Policy in Selection Markets” with Neale Mahoney and André Veiga, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 2014 10(1): “Of Special Interest” article 2. (published version) (SSRN)

A reasonable degree of market power may be healthy in markets, such as insurance and finance, where selection is important.

“The First-Order Approach to Merger Analysis” with Sonia Jaffe, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2013, 5(4): 188-2138. (published version) (SSRN) (policy piece)

We formalize, generalize, and clarify the sense in which the effect of a merger on prices and welfare is approximated by the pass-through of cannibalized profits, the foundation of the new UK and US horizontal merger guidelines.

“Retos para un Mercado de Libre Competencia: El Control de Fusiones y Carteles” in ¿Competidores o Monopolistas? edited by Jaime Delgado and published by the Instituto de Consumo at the Universidad de San Martín de Porres in Lima, Perú, 2011. (link to pre-pubilcation version)

Perú should introduce merger control to stop the increasing monopolization of its markets.

“A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms,” American Economic Review, 2010, 100 (4): 1642-72. (published version) (published appendix) (SSRN) (appendix draft)  (audio)

A general theory of monopoly pricing by multi-sided platforms, emphasizing the importance of the source of user heterogeneity, with applications to regulation, measurement of market power and merger analysis.

“Monopoly, Ramsey and Lindahl in Rochet and Tirole (2003),” Economics Letters, 2009, 103 (2), 99-100. (SSRN) (published version)

The relationship between social and private pricing in RT2003.

“Biasing Auctions,” Princeton University, April 2006 (inactive). (SSRN)

Different explanations of equilibrium winner’s curse have different implications for auction design and are testable.

Law and Economics

“Property is Another Name for Monopoly: Facilitating Efficient Bargaining with Partial Common Ownership of Corporations, Land and Spectrum” with Eric A. Posner, accepted subject to minor revisions at the Journal of Legal Analysis as of December 2016. (SSRN)

Replacing private property with a system of self-assessed asset taxation with compulsory sales could solve many classic problems in property law.

“A Proposal for Limiting the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors” with Eric A. Posner and Fiona Scott Morton, submitted November 2016. (SSRN) (op-ed)

No investor owning multiple firms in an oligopoly should be able to hold more than 1% of each firm or participate in corporate governance, to avoid harmful accumulation of market power.

“Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics” with Eric A. Posner, Vanderbilt Law Review, 2015, 68(2): 441-499. (SSRN)  (Chronicle of Higher Education coverage) (Wall Street Cheat Sheet coverage) (interview)

Quadratic voting would be a more just and equitable method of public decisions than standard democratic institutions are.

“Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: Criticisms and Responses” with Eric A. Posner, Yale Law Journal Forum, 2015, 124: January 22. (published version)

A response to John Coates’s critique of cost-benefit analysis for financial regulation.

“Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation” with Eric A. Posner, Journal of Legal Studies, 2014, 43(S2): S1-34. (SSRN) (policy piece) (op-ed) (blog post) (Bloomberg View editorial endorsing our argument)

Why and how benefit-cost analysis of financial regulations should be conducted.

“Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance” with Eric Posner, University of Chicago Law Review, 2014, 81(1): 251-272. (SSRN) (policy piece with Sang-Seung Yi) (op-ed in New York Times) (op-ed in Financial Times) (blog post)

Quadratic Voting is a simple, efficient and robust mechanims for protecting minority shareholders.

“A Solution to the Collective Action Problem in Corporate Reorganizations” with Eric Posner, September 2013 (inactive). (SSRN) (blog post)

In contrast to previous bankruptcy reforms, a system we propose based on Quadratic Voting allows collective action, which is needed for efficiency.

“An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to 21st Century Financial Markets” with Eric Posner, Northwestern University Law Review, 2013, 107(3): 1307-1358. (SSRN) (NYTimes piece by Simon Johnson endorsing the idea) (Wired piece by Dan Ariely enorsing the idea) (NYTimes coverage) (Washington Post coverage) (The Atlantic coverage) (Huffington Post coverage) (Chicago Tonight television appearance) (Russia Today television appearance) (Fox television appearance) (Bloomberg View piece) (Slate piece) (blog coverage) (original op-ed that proposed the idea in 2008)

A pre-approval regulatory process for new financial derivatives is a practical means to help avoid the proliferation of harmful products.

Market Design

“Raffles” with Nicole Immorlica, Christina Lee, Brendan Lucier and Josh Mollner, under preparation.  Email me for early notes.

A simple variant on the familiar “trick-tray” raffle implements approximate cardinal efficiency in the allocation of indivisible goods without transfers in a large population.

“Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search” with Bobby Kleinberg and Bo Waggoner, extended abstract in the Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC ’16) in 2016,  submitted December 2016. (extended abstract) (SSRN) (online appendix) (simulation code)

Descending price auctions, unlike all other standard formats, allow for efficient information acquisition.

“Quadratic Voting and the Public Good: Introduction” with Eric Posner, forthcoming in Public Choice as part of a special issue on Quadratic Voting and the Public Good in 2017. (SSRN)

An opinionated survey of the literature on Quadratic Voting, with a focus on the contributions to this special issue from several disciplines.

“The Robustness of Quadratic Voting,” forthcoming in Public Choice as part of a special issue on Quadratic Voting and the Public Good in 2017. (SSRN)

Quadratic Voting is quite robust to collusion, fraud, aggregate uncertainty and “irrational” voter behavior.


“Matching Markets in the Digital Age” with Eduardo M. Azevedo, Science, 2016, 352 (6289): 1056-1067. (abstract) (reprint) (full text)

How interdisciplinary academic-industry collaborations can improve matching markets.

“Quadratic Voting” with Steven P. Lalley, submitted June 2016. (SSRN) (appendix) (op-ed) (Financial Times coverage) (Hacker News discussion) (Wall Street Journal coverage) (Slate coverage) (Freakonomics blog post) (Overcoming Bias blog post) (Marginal Revolution blog post)

In a large but finite population with private information, Quadratic Voting leads to approximate efficiency, with inefficiency decaying as 1/N.

“The Efficiency of Quadratic Voting in Finite Populations,” February 2015. (SSRN)

In simulations, Quadratic Voting never has more than a few percent inefficiency even in very small populations.


“Concordance among Holdouts” with Scott Duke Kominers, extended abstract in the Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC ’11) in 2011,  September 2012. Under active revision with also Jerry Green and Steven Lalley.  Email me for updates. (SSRN) (published abstract) (presentation video)

A compromise on property rights that allows a reasonable degree of efficiency through simple, incentive compatible mechanisms in land assembly.

“Holdout in the Assembly of Complements: A Problem for Market Design” with Scott Duke Kominers, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 2012, 102(3):360-365. (published version) (SSRN)

Competition within, but not between, complementary clusters solve the holdout problem; resettlement does so partially.

Public Finance

“The Openness-Equality Trade-Off in Global Redistribution,” forthcoming in the Economic Journal for a feature on Normative Ethics and Welfare Economics as of August 2016. (SSRN) (online appendix) (Huffington Post coverage) (op-ed)

Because they allow so much more immigration, the oppressive GCC countries do much more per capita to reduce global inequality than do “liberal” OECD countries.

“Pricing Institutions and the Welfare Cost of Adverse Selection” with André Veiga, forthcoming in the American Economic Journal: Microeconomics as of May 2016. (SSRN)

An apparently subtle change in pricing institutions can reduce the welfare cost of adverse selection by an order of magnitude.

“Taxation and the Allocation of Talent,” with Benjamin B. Lockwood and Charles G. Nathanson, forthcoming in the Journal of Political Economy as of March 2016. (SSRN) (online appendix) (media coverage) (video blog appearance) (blog coverage)

Designing taxes to sorting talented efficiently across professions can rationalize the basic structure of US taxes without any redistributive motive.

History of Economics

“Price Theory,” under revision at the request of the Journal of Economic Literature as of March 2016. (SSRN) (slides)

“Price Theory” means economic analysis that reduces rich and often incompletely-specified models to a small collection of “prices” (approximately) sufficient to characterize solutions to simple allocative problems.

“Finance and the Common Good”, forthcoming in After the Flood: How the Crisis Changed Economic Thought (see below). (SSRN)

Finance mostly focuses on predicting asset prices, while IO focuses on prescribing industrial policies, possibly because of the consulting opportunities in each field.

“Jewish Economies: Development and Migration in America and Beyond,” two volumes of Simon Kuznets’s unpublished or unavailable-in-English papers on the economic history of the Jews, edited jointly with Stephanie Lo will include an introductory, original research chapter by myself entitled “Simon Kuznets: Cautious Empiricist of the Eastern European Jewish Diaspora”.  The first volume of the book, “The Economic Life of American Jewry” was published in November 2011.  The second volume, “Comparative Perspectives on Jewish Migration”, was published in January 2012. (Amazon volume 1) (Amazon volume 2) (publisher’s page) (SSRN) (Usury paper) (data) (NPR appearance)

Much of Simon Kuznets’s economic thinking was closely tied to his Russian Jewish heritage.


After the Flood: How the Crisis Changed Economic Thought, collection of essays I am editing jointly with Ed Glaeser and Tano Santos coming out of a conference in honor of José Scheinkman in March 2013.  The contributors are Aloisio Araujo, Patrick Bloton, Ed Glaeser, Lars Hansen, Pete Kyle, Tano Santos and Wei Xiong.  In addition to co-authoring the introudction, my contribution, “Finance and the Common Good”, will for the conclusion of the volume.  It is forthcoming from the University of Chicago Press in 2017.

Leading economists reflect on the causes, consequences for economics and appropriate policy responses to the financial crisis.

“Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation” with Eric Posner, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 2013 103(3). (published version) (SSRN) (policy piece) (blog post)

Principles that should be applied in the growing industry of benefit-cost analyses of financial regulations

“Is Arbitrage Socially Beneficial?” Princeton University, October 2007 (inactive). (SSRN)

Arbitrage and financial innovation are harmful when arbitrage opportunities are created by irrational investors.

“Universal Speculation,” Princeton University, May 2006 (inactive). (request a copy)

The “Universal Portfolios” algorithm of Cover (1991) conflicts would not be used by a Bayesian investor.

Other interdisciplinary work (philosophy and biology)

“Economic Contract Theory Tests Models of Mutualism” with Megan Frederickson, Doug W. Yu and Naomi Pierce, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2010, 107(36): 15712-6. (published version) (media coverage from University of Toronto) (media coverage from Harvard)

A general, economics-based methodology for testing theories of mutualism supports Partner Fidelity Feedback over Host Sanctions.

“Whose Rights? A Critique of Individual Agency as the Basis of Rights,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2009, 8(2), 139-171. (published version) (SSRN) (working draft doc)

If you think groups should not have rights because they are not agents, then you shouldn’t believe in individual rights either.

“Overconfidence in Neural Networks,” Princeton University, May 2006 (inactive). (request a copy)

Overconfidence arises naturally in a classical neural network model.

Methodology and Econometrics

“Slutsky meets Marschak: First-Order Identification of Multi-product Production,” December 2009 (inactive). (SSRN) (appendix)

The econometric identification approach corresponding to Chetty’s “sufficient statistics approach,” solved for multi-product producers.

“A Simple Theory of Scientific Learning,” September 2007 (inactive). (SSRN) (short summary)

A model for testing theories with precise predictions against theories with vague predictions.

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